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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2008).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Appellant raises one issue for this court to review, whether the trial erred in
denying Appellant's motion to strike and to dismiss underlying proceedings for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant fails to include the standard of
review with supporting authority for this issue as required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5). Appellant also fails to provide citations to the record showing that the
issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement of grounds for seeking review
of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(5)(A) and (B). Appellee restates or further addresses Appellant's issues as
follows:
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly deny Appellant's motion to strike and to
dismiss underlying proceedings?
Standard of review: "Ordinarily, the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside
judgment is reviewed on a deferential, abuse of discretion standard; however,
determination whether to set aside judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is reviewed without deference to trial court."
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Van DerStappen v. Van DerStappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App.,1991).
Preservation of issue: This issue was raised in Appellant's motion to strike and to
dismiss underlying proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (R. 205)
which motion was denied. (R. 222).
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STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal arises out of a modification of a divorce decree originally issued
in South Dakota. The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case and the parties
after conferring with the South Dakota court, and subsequently modified the South
Dakota decree. Appellant participated in pretrial litigation, the trial, and various
post-trial motions. Appellant then moved the trial court to dismiss the entire
proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which motion was denied. This
appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties Carol Ann Huebner ("Carol") and Derrick Robert LaVoie

("Derrick") were married on June 14, 1986. (R. 79).
2.

The parties are the parents of one child, Nathan LaVoie, born July 14,

1993. (R. 79).
3.

The parties were divorced by a decree of divorce issued in the state of

South Dakota on June 5, 2000. (R.79).
4.

Carol was awarded custody of Nathan in the South Dakota case. (R.

5.

In August 2005, Carol and Nathan moved to Washington County,

6).

Utah and have continuously resided in Washington County since that time. (R.
21).
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6.

The South Dakota decree was filed as a foreign judgment in the Fifth

Judicial District Court in Washington County on July 20, 2007, and was assigned
to the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow. (R. 1).
7.

On August 14, 2007, Carol filed a motion for transfer of jurisdiction

and communication between courts. (R. 9). The motion was served on Derrick at
his address in Arroyo Grande, California. (R. 11).
8.

In her motion, Carol sought to have Utah assume jurisdiction over the

entire case, and have South Dakota relinquish custody over the entire case. (R.
16).
9.

Derrick did not oppose the motion and a request to submit for decision

on the motion was filed on September 7, 2007. (R. 26).
10.

In a handwritten order dated September 17, 2007, Judge Ludlow

stated that he had spoken with the Honorable Warren G. Johnson in South Dakota
and that both he and Judge Johnson concurred that jurisdiction over the case should
be in the Fifth District Court, Washington County, Utah. The order was served on
Carol's counsel and on Derrick. (R. 29).
11.

On September 13, 2007, Judge Johnson sent a letter to Judge Ludlow

indicating that he concurred with the motion to transfer jurisdiction. The letter was
served on Carol's counsel and on Derrick (R. 28).
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12.

On January 25, 2008, Carol filed a petition to modify decree of

custody, seeking to modify Derrick's child support obligation. (R. 31).
13.

On February 21, 2008, Derrick filed an answer to the petition to

modify. (R. 58). In his answer, Derrick did not raise the issue of lack of
jurisdiction. (R. 58).
14.

Following a trial on September 18, 2008, the trial court entered

findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 12, 2008.
15.

On December 17, 2008, the trial court entered its order modifying the

decree of divorce. (R. 95). A judgment for unpaid child support in favor of Carol
and against Derrick was entered on the same date. (R. 98).
16.

On December 31, 2008, Derrick moved for a new trial. (R. 114).

17.

On May 11, 2009 a hearing was held on Derrick's motion for new

trial. (R. 171).
18.

On July 22, 2009, the trial court issued its order denying Derrick's

motion for new trial. (R. 185).
19.

On August 7, 2009, Derrick filed a petition to modify decree of

divorce. (R. 189).
20.

On August 13,2009, Carol filed her answer to Derrick's petition to

modify. (R. 202).
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21.

On October 21, 2009, Derrick filed a motion to dismiss and strike

underlying proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 205).
22.

On December 9, 2009, the trial court issued its order denying

Derrick's motion to dismiss. (R. 222).
23.

On January 11, 2010, Derrick filed his notice of appeal. (R. 226).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

Derrick's Notice of Appeal is Untimely.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice

of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of
the entry of the order appealed from. The order denying Derrick's motion to
dismiss was entered on December 9, 2009. Derrick filed his notice of appeal on
January 11, 2010, more than 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from.
In calculating the time for filing a notice of appeal, and determining whether such a
notice is timely and establishes jurisdiction in the appellate court, "the Court of
Appeals must be bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal
transmitted to it by the trial court." Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P. 2d
1230 (Utah App. 1995). Because his notice of appeal is untimely, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
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II.

The Trial Court Properly Ruled that It Had Jurisdiction.
Derrick cites Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA or the "Act")

in support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the
South Dakota decree. However, unlike cases in which the issuing court retains
ongoing jurisdiction over the case, the South Dakota court had relinquished
jurisdiction over the present case and had transferred jurisdiction over the case to
the state of Utah and the trial court below. This transfer of jurisdiction was
accomplished pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-101, etseq. ("UCCJEA"). The trial
court conferred with the issuing court in South Dakota and determined that
jurisdiction over the case was properly in Utah, not in Dakota, and jurisdiction was
transferred accordingly. South Dakota then no longer had jurisdiction over the
case, and Utah assumed full jurisdiction, taking this case out of the purview of the
Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

Derrick's Notice of Appeal is Untimely.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice

of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of
the entry of the order appealed from. The order denying Derrick's motion to
Appeal No. .: 20100050-CA
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dismiss was entered on December 9, 2009. Derrick filed his notice of appeal on
January 11? 2010, more than 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from.
Derrick's notice of appeal was due on or before January 8, 2010, in order to be
timely filed. Derrick's notice of appeal is dated January 8, 2010, but the trial
court's stamp indicates that it was filed on January 11, 2010. In calculating the
time for filing a notice of appeal, and determining whether such a notice is timely
and establishes jurisdiction in the appellate court, "the Court of Appeals must be
bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the
trial court." Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P. 2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995).
The issue of a discrepancy between a dated signature on a notice of appeal
and the date stamp of the trial court, as it relates to the timeliness of a notice of
appeal, was addressed in Glezos. In Glezos, a notice of cross-appeal had been
filed but returned for lack of filing fee. The original date stamp had been whited
out and the notice had been restamped at the time the filing fee was paid. In
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court stated as follows:

Frontier next argues that we should deem its cross-appeal
timely filed, or excuse its untimeliness. Frontier claims the
district court originally received and stamped its notice of
appeal February 2, but that the court later whited out this date
and mailed the notice back to Frontier's attorney due to a $100
deficiency in the remitted filing fee. Upon its return with the
proper fee, the clerk stamped the notice February 8. Frontier
urges this court to ignore the February 8 stamp and reach the
Appeal No..: 20100050-CA
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merits of its cross-appeal, claiming it was the court clerk's error
in imparting mistaken information regarding the filing fee that
caused the untimely filing.
This court does not have the authority to do as Frontier
requests. In State ex rel M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah App.1989),
we held that "[i]n determining whether a notice of appeal is
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an appellate court,
this court must be bound by the filing date indicated on the
notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court." Id. at 1288.
Thus, we are bound by the date stamped on Frontier's notice of
cross-appeal.
Further, in State ex rel. M.S., this court emphasized that the
exclusive procedure for extending the time for filing a notice of
appeal lies under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Id. Rule 4(e) provides in relevant part:
The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, [footnote omitted]
Utah R.App.P. 4(e). Thus, Frontier's remedy upon having its
notice of cross-appeal returned was to file a motion to extend
time with the district court. This court cannot consider such
motions, or grant such extensions, on appeal. *1234 State ex
rel. M.S., 781 P.2d at 1289. We therefore have no jurisdiction to
consider Frontier's cross-appeal.
Glezos, 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 -1234 (Utah App. 1995).
Because his notice of appeal is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
this appeal.
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II.

The Trial Court Properly Ruled that It Had Jurisdiction.
Derrick cites the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA or the

"Act") in support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
the South Dakota decree. However, unlike cases in which the issuing court retains
ongoing jurisdiction over the case, the South Dakota court had relinquished
jurisdiction over the present case and had transferred jurisdiction over the case to
the state of Utah and the trial court below. This transfer of jurisdiction was
accomplished pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-101, et seq. ("UCCJEA"). The trial
court conferred with the issuing court in South Dakota and determined that
jurisdiction over the case was properly in Utah, not in Dakota, and jurisdiction was
transferred accordingly. South Dakota then no longer had jurisdiction over the
case, and Utah assumed full jurisdiction, taking this case out of the purview of the
Act.
Further, the Act provides that a court of this state may assert jurisdiction
over a non-resident if the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by
consent or by entering general appearance. The Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14201(l)(b). Derrick entered a general appearance and at no time did he object to the
Court's jurisdiction.
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Guidance on this issue is found in Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28. In
Johnson, the parties stipulated to a divorce and property settlement. Mr. Johnson
later challenged the divorce decree claiming, among other things, that the trial
court lack jurisdiction because the parties were never legally married. In affirming
the denial of Mr. Johnson's motion to vacate, the court stated as follows:
"Subject matter jurisdiction ... is the authority of the court to
decide the case." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 38, 100 P.3d
1177. "The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
(2003)). Usually, "in order to challenge subject matter
jurisdiction, [a party is] required to challenge the authority of
the court to hear the underlying case." Id.
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all
cases where the court's competence is at issue. "Where the court
has jurisdiction over the class of case involved, judgment is not
void on the ground that the right involved in the suit did not
embrace the relief granted." Perry v. McLaughlin, 754 P.2d
679, 682 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Rather, the concept of subject
matter jurisdiction relates to "the relationship between the claim
and the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction."
Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 35, 100 P.3d 1177. Instances where a
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction include when a federal
court is asked to adjudicate matters of state law with no
diversity of citizenship, Stephens v. Wal-mart Stores, 2010 WL
1487213, *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35506, *4 (M.D.Ga.2010);
when a state court is asked to adjudicate a matter of
administrative law when the parties have not exhausted their
administrative remedies, Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,
TfTf 9, 11, 44 P.3d 724; or when the statute permitting a party to
sue another party requires statutory compliance, as with notice
of claim requirements for suit against governmental entities,
Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,120, 26 P.3d 217. In these
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instances, the court cannot adjudicate the case because it has
not been given the authority to do so.
Because parties can raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time
during a proceeding, it makes sense to cabin the issues that fall
under the category of subject matter jurisdiction. See Chen,
2004 UT 82,1[ 36, 100 P.3d 1177 (finding that parties
mischaracterized their claim as a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in order to avoid waiver); cf. State v. Norris, 2007
UT 5, % 9, 152 P.3d 305 (finding that a defendant's
constitutional challenge to the statute under which he was
convicted did not raise a challenge to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction). For this reason, most of our cases that have
addressed subject matter jurisdiction have considered the
authority of the court to adjudicate a class of cases, rather than
the specifics of an individual case. In *1103 Career Service
Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, for instance,
we held that the Career Service Review Board (the "Board")
did not lose subject matter jurisdiction over a career service
employee as a result of the factual intricacies of the case. 942
P.2d 933, 941-42 (Utah 1997). A statute clearly gave the Board
jurisdiction over appeals from reprimand decisions of the
department of corrections. Id. at 941. Because the Board had
statutory authority to consider the appeal, we determined that
the specific facts went to the merits rather than to whether the
Board had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the
first place. Id. at 942. We came to a similar conclusion in Chen
when we held that a challenge to the court's authority to appoint
an interim CEO in the context of a company dispute did not
raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 2004 UT 82, \ 49,
100 P.3d 1177. Rather, because the court had the authority to
hear the underlying dispute, the challenge was more properly
characterized as a challenge to the court's exercise of its
equitable powers. Id. \ 50.
*

*

5JC

The limited definition of subject matter jurisdiction applied in
other cases differs significantly from our holding in Cajfall,
where we held that a district court lacks subject matter
Appeal No..: 20100050-CA
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jurisdiction to adjudicate a divorce if no underlying marriage
exists. 303 P.2d at 288. Because the district court clearly has
the authority to adjudicate divorces, looking to the specific facts
of a particular case is inconsistent with our usual definition of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals in Van Der
Stappen v. Van Der Stappen points out that the Caffall holding
is "inconsistent with the generally announced and fundamental
legal proposition that 'subject matter jurisdiction is the
authority and competency of the court to decide the case/
without which, the court may not validly act." 815 P.2d 1335,
1339 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (quoting Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). Unlike cases where a
party has not exhausted its administrative remedies or has failed
to comply with statutory prerequisites to suit, "[t]he discovery
that the parties never had a valid marriage [does] not... divest
the court of its authority to resolve the dispute between them."
Id. at 1339 n. 8. As a result, the holding in Caffall
"unnecessarily blurs the distinction between a mistake as to the
exact nature of the subject matter in dispute and the court's
ultimate authority and competence to decide the dispute." Id.
Just as a court adjudicating a contract dispute has the authority
to determine that no contract exists without losing subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute, a court has the authority to
adjudicate a divorce claim even if the court later determines that
no marriage ever existed. We therefore overrule our holding in
Caffall and hold that because courts of general jurisdiction have
the authority to adjudicate divorces, we will not invalidate a
divorce decree on the grounds that the "right involved in the
suit did not *1104 embrace the relief granted." See Perry, 754
P.2d at 682.
f 13 In this case, the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate Ms. Johnson's petition for divorce.
Because Mr. Johnson's motion to vacate the divorce decree
under rule 60(b) was premised on the erroneous assumption that
the original district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the divorce, the motion was properly denied.
Although the district court based its denial of the 60(b) motion
on other grounds, we are free to affirm the dismissal on any
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grounds apparent from the record. See First Equity Fed., Inc. v.
Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, f 11, 52 P.3d 1137.
Johnson v. Johnson, 234 P.3d 1100, 1102 -1104 (Utah 2010)
The Holding in Johnson supports the trial court's denial of Derrick's motion
in the present case. The trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate child support. The
matter was presented to the trial court and was fully and fairly litigated on the
merits. The failure of technical compliance with the Act should not serve to
invalidate the orders of the trial court.
ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION
Appellee does not request oral argument or a published opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in her brief, Appellee requests that this court affirm
the trial court's denial of Derrick's motion to strike and to dismiss.
DATED this<2K%ay of August, 2010
BRINDLEY SULLIVAN

Brent M. Brindley
Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellee
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